On 27 August, the second reading of the Government Procurement Bill 2025 was held in the House of Representatives.
The bill was met with intense scrutiny from opposition MPs and even from within the “Madani” (trustworthy) government.
The Center to Combat Corruption and Cronyism (C4 Center) had previously analysed the bill in a previous statement on 26 August, raising key issues:
- Granting almost unchecked powers of procurement approval to the finance minister and state chief ministers
- Establishing an appeal tribunal and appeals process which is not independent of the executive
- Concentrating power in the registrar which may lead to abuse
- Weakening oversight, accountability, and the scope of the act through numerous clauses
- Granting authorised public officers under the treasury and state financial authorities wide investigative and enforcement powers that, in some cases, exceed police powers
These issues were voiced in the House yesterday.
C4 Center reiterates that the bill in its current form will not address existing problems within the procurement system. Instead, it cements the institutional flaws of the status quo that have previously led to grand corruption.
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Thus, C4 Center demands that the government does not pass the Government Procurement Bill in its current form.
The bill must be revised with meaningful stakeholder engagement – including a review by the parliamentary Special Select Committee on Finance and Economy – to ensure a procurement regime that actually strengthens integrity, transparency and benefit for the people.
C4 Center highlights several further issues with the bill below.
Bill rushed through
A major point raised in the House of Representatives was the exceedingly brief period from when the white paper was released by the Attorney General’s Chambers to its most recent reading in Parliament.
The chronology was as follows:
- 12 August – White paper surrendered by the Attorney General’s Chambers and distributed in a cabinet meeting for summarising
- 20 August – White paper brought to cabinet
- 22 August – Cabinet meeting approved the draft bill
- 23–24 August – Blue bill printed
- 25 August – First reading of the bill in the House
- 26 August – Briefing session on the bill with government-aligned MPs
- 27 August – Second and third readings of the bill
As was correctly pointed out, almost the entirety of the bill’s life cycle took 15 days. This raises serious questions about why the bill is being rushed through the legislative process by the government.
This is especially egregious considering:
- The bill is an entirely new law that will regulate almost all government procurement at both the federal and state levels
- The Bill is 91 pages and 93 clauses long and deals with major areas of governance in relation to government expenditure, the national economy and infrastructure
- MPs, the business community, civil society and the public were very clearly not given enough time to read the bill, analyse its contents and implications, and raise questions about it in the two days between its first and subsequent readings
Concentrates power in finance minister
The multitude of provisions within the bill that afford wide-ranging powers to the finance minister and state chief ministers was highlighted by C4 Center in our original analysis of the bill, and this was repeated in the House.
The degree to which ministers are afforded decision-making powers throughout the procurement process is staggering.
Ministers can:
- approve procurements with no upper limit of contract value
- dictate regulations and the process by which approvals take place
- appoint members of the appeal tribunal
- exempt individuals and entire classes of persons from being subject to this procurement law
- amend the schedule which sets the contract value approving bodies can decide on
It is clear as can be that the Minister of Finance is disproportionately empowered by this bill with no meaningful checks and balances.
MPs supporting the bill largely do not even deny that the bill affords the minister these powers. Instead, they cite “internal controls” that would act as a sufficient mechanism of checks and balances.
It is contended here that such ‘internal controls” are few and far between in the bill. The ones that are present do little to alleviate the risks of corruption and abuse of power, which would almost certainly arise should the minister be afforded such wide powers over government procurement.
Observing these ‘internal controls’ closer reveals they are piecemeal. Such controls cited in the House include:
- Clause 37 – mandates a duty to disclose interest upon any person administering, conducting or implementing a government procurement, failing which a sanction of a fine or imprisonment or both is imposed
- Clause 79 – that states that proceedings of the appeals tribunal shall be made open to the public
- Clause 6 – outlines the role of the Treasury secretary general to be responsible for the administration, control and supervision of all matters relating to the bill
The disclosure of interest requirement appears to merely be just that – a requirement to disclose. Nowhere in the bill does it require the Minister to recuse himself from a decision where there is a conflict of interest.
What use is a public hearing when the minister appoints the individuals for the appeals tribunal. There is no prescribed avenue for the public to even participate or provide input in the process. Here, the public hearing is nothing but a performance for viewing.
With regard to Clause 6 and the responsibilities of the secretary general, none of the provisions regarding the exercise of the minister’s powers under this bill mention how they can be kept in check by the secretary general.
Clause 13(4) makes clear that the minister’s approval of procurements is “final”. Nowhere does it say that the secretary general would be able to intervene in this or any other decision.
This is all even before considering that the Treasury secretary general is a member of the executive, subservient to the finance minister – who is currently also the prime minister. The Treasury itself is an agency under the purview of the Ministry of Finance led by the finance minister.
In the simplest of terms, how can the secretary general possibly exercise control over the finance minister, a superior?
Control of rampant subcontracting?
One of the issues raised yesterday was that the bill was absolutely necessary as it would prevent rampant and uncontrolled subcontracting – a practice that has cost the government a great deal of losses and led leading to poor quality or incomplete infrastructure projects.
It was stated that Clause 35 on “Prohibition on transfer, etc., of Government procurement” would prevent subcontracting from taking place.
However, this clause does not necessarily prevent subcontracting at all because it only prohibits a person from transferring, assigning or novating a contract without prior approval of the controlling officer responsible for the government procurement.
There is not much control being imposed at all since the approval of a single controlling officer is barely a barrier and would not realistically prevent ‘cartelisation’ of the civil service – a problem that already exists in the status quo.
Furthermore, Clause 35 only binds the primary “registered person” who is a vendor registered with the registrar of government procurement under Clause 18.
The provisions of the bill do not explicitly state that the transfer of a contract under Clause 35 must be to a secondary “registered person” or if a further tertiary person must be registered.
Taken as is, the law barely eradicates subcontracting issues at all if approval by the controlling officer is only necessary for the primary registered person.
Illusory checks and balances
Perplexingly, many MPs who supported the bill raised mechanisms of checks and balances that were not even present in the bill to begin with.
Vague terms such as “accountability to Parliament”, “performance-based” and “transparency” were thrown around.
First, there is no mention of anybody or individual that is elected to any role stipulated in the bill through a vote by Parliament. Nor is there mention of any duty to report findings or to be accountable to Parliament.
Additionally, the bill makes no mention of performance as a measure to which vendors and procuring entities are held accountable. It is unclear why these were raised at all.
Second, on the matter of “transparency”, the bill does not impose a minimum standard of procurement-related information disclosure by any party. Nor does it even mandate any form of public disclosure at all. The only provision that makes reference to such an issue is Clause 25 on the power to publish information:
If the Registrar (of Government Procurement) thinks that it is necessary or expedient in the interest of the public, the Registrar may publish any information in the form and manner as may be determined by the Registrar…
The wording of this particular provision is extremely important because of its legal implications:
- The registrar has the power to subjectively decide what information is relevant to the public interest
- Even if the registrar decides that something is public interest, they are still not obligated to publish the information
Bear in mind that under Clause 14, the registrar of government procurement is a public officer of the Treasury who is appointed to the position by the Treasury secretary general, thus making the registrar a non-independent civil servant whose office is still subsidiary to the Ministry of Finance.
Grasping at future straws
Lastly, and perhaps as a way of obscuring the obvious shortcomings of the bill, many supporters of the bill made statements along the lines of: “pass the law now and it can be amended and improved later”, “this bill is still an improvement over the status quo” and “do not let good be the enemy of perfect”.
Our unequivocal response to these statements is that the Government Procurement Bill is dangerous and harmful. It is nothing more than a rushed, flawed piece of legislation that is only transparent in that it transparently sacrifices good governance and anti-corruption principles in service of political interests.
It is not an improvement over the status quo but would be a sharp decline from it. It entrenches, codifies and whitewashes all existing corruption and ministerial interference in government procurement, making interventions and remedies even more unattainable than they already are.
Disastrous procurement scandals such as the littoral combat ships, Scorpene submarines, defective ventilators during the Covid pandemic, and many more were all caused by unilateral decision-making by ministers. This Government Procurement Bill will grease the wheels for such scandals to take place again.
There is no guarantee that if passed, such a bill would ever be amended in the foreseeable future.
It should raise alarms not only because government MPs were so eager to rush this bill through Parliament, but also because criticism and calls to redraft the bill were made by MPs within the ruling coalition itself.
C4 Center echoes calls made by MPs who rejected the bill and for it to be referred back to the parliamentary Special Select Committee on Finance and Economy, who were notably left out during the initial phase of this bill’s drafting.
There will be no greater shame than to vote in favour of this bill – especially by MPs who previously championed for meaningful reform.
The bill must not be allowed to pass. – C4 Center
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