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One clause, two readings

A Perak man’s lawyers and the courts differ on what section 1(e) means.

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Most countries use a combination of two principles to determine whether a person is a citizen by operation of law. This means citizenship as a birthright, or automatically.

The principles are:

  • Jus soli – means ‘right of the soil’ in Latin. Being born in that country gives the person the right to be a citizen of the country.
  • Jus sanguinis – means ‘right of blood’ in Latin, or the right of lineage. This requires at least one parent who is a citizen of that country.

Different countries give differing weight to these two principles. In the US, for example, jus soli carries far greater weight than in Malaysia. If a refugee mother delivers in the US, that confers the right to citizenship on the child. President Donald Trump tried to restrict this birthright by executive order, but the US Supreme Court rejected the move in June 2026.

Malaysia requires elements of both principles to be satisfied, with more weight on lineage or jus sanguinis.

Articles 14 and 15 of the Federal Constitution specify the circumstances that confer the right to Malaysian citizenship. Any person who satisfies any of these sets of conditions is a citizen “by operation of law”.

Other constitutional articles such as 15A, 16 and 19 provide for registration or naturalisation. In those cases, the Federal Government has a role in deciding the application.

Why the rules are detailed

Citizenship was a big deal in the late 1950s. At independence, the number of non-Malays in Malaya was about equal to the number of Malays.

Some Malay leaders feared that the more economically well-off and educated non-Malay population would progress faster than the Malays. They worried this would leave the Malays in a second-class position in their own motherland.

This was not an unreasonable or irrational fear. Just consider the situations of indigenous peoples in Latin America, black people in South Africa and the Maori in New Zealand.

As a result, the circumstances that would confer citizenship of Malaysia were specified in great detail. They were included in the Federal Constitution as the Second Schedule, which has three parts.

Part I of the Second Schedule is titled ‘Citizenship by operation of law of persons born before Malaysia Day’.

Part II is titled ‘Citizenship by operation of law of persons born on or after Malaysia Day’.

Part III, the longest, is titled ‘Supplementary provisions relating to citizenship’.

Articles 14 to 19 of the Federal Constitution have to be read together with the relevant provisions of the Second Schedule. Only then can we determine a person’s right to Malaysian citizenship.

The case of Mr V

One such person is Mr V, who was born in Tanjung Malim, Perak, in 1987. He has a birth certificate which attests to the date and place of birth as well as to his mother’s name.

His mother, Madam B, had no documents at the time of V’s birth. She was the last child of an immigrant Indian family. Her eldest sibling was born in India and brought to Malaysia as a child. Her other siblings were all born in Malaysia and obtained Malaysian citizenship – probably under Article 16 of the Federal Constitution.

A DNA test linked B to this set of siblings. It established that Madam P, the last surviving sibling, shares the same parents as B.

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Based on this, and the testimony of P and other family members, we managed to register the birth of B. She was born in 1952 in Kuala Lumpur.

V’s father has not been with the family for the past 25 years. Going by section 17 of Part III of the Second Schedule, he would have no bearing on V’s application for citizenship since V’s parents never registered their marriage.

Thus, V’s father’s Malaysian citizenship could not be used as grounds for V’s citizenship application.

We applied to the National Registration Department in Meru, Ipoh. We argued that section 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule, read together with Article 14(1)(b) of the Federal Constitution, confers citizenship by operation of law.

Since this is at the crux of the matter, we need to know the actual wording of the relevant sections.

Article 14(1): “[…] the following persons are citizens by operation of law”

Article 14(1)(b): “Every person born on or after Malaysia Day and having any of the qualifications specified in Part II of the Second Schedule”

Section 1 of Part II of the Second Schedule: “The following persons born on or after Malaysia Day are citizens by operation of law”

Section 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule: “Every person born within the Federation who is not born a citizen of any country otherwise than by virtue of this paragraph”

To us, it seemed crystal clear that V:

  • was born in Tanjung Malim, Perak (within the federation)
  • was born on 24 February 1987 (after Malaysia Day)
  • has a mother who was not a citizen of any other country at the time of his birth, or at any point in her life

The third point establishes that V had no valid claim to citizenship of any other country at birth. He therefore satisfies all the requirements under 1(e) and should be recognised as a citizen by operation of law.

So, we were disappointed when the Registration Department rejected our application for citizenship for V. But we were not too surprised, as citizenship has long been a contentious issue in this country. Some of the old anxieties mentioned above may still shape attitudes in parts of the bureaucracy.

But we believed that the courts would set things right. The outcome, however, was not what we had hoped for.

What the courts said

Annou Xavier of Azri, Lee Swee Seng & Co graciously agreed to represent V in court pro bono (free of charge).

Our judicial review application was filed in the High Court in April 2024. We asked for an order of certiorari to quash the Registration Department’s rejection of V’s application for citizenship. We also asked for an order of mandamus requiring the department to register him as a Malaysian citizen.

Unfortunately, the learned judge turned down our application. In his written judgment he began by noting: “Being a fundamental right, it has been held that citizenship rights have to be construed as widely as possible without changing or warping the base meaning, while the provisions that limit those rights must be construed as narrowly as possible” (para 11 of the grounds of judgment).

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In para 17, the learned judge refers to three Court of Appeal decisions. These “held that the concept of jus soli and jus sanguinis are embedded in Section 1(e), and the burden of proof lies on the applicant to fulfil both requirements. Needless to say, I am bound by these decisions.”

This observation is true. If V’s mother had been a citizen of another country, for example India, V would have had a path to citizenship there at birth. In other words, jus sanguinis would have offered a route to citizenship in another country. That may have affected his right to citizenship in Malaysia under 1(e).

The absence of any such route, on the basis of his mother’s citizenship, is precisely why we believe V qualifies under 1(e).

However, the learned judge did not accept that V had proved he satisfied the jus sanguinis element for the purposes of section 1(e). In para 28 of his grounds of judgment, the judge states: “it would appear that the appellant would need to satisfy both the requirements of jus soli and jus sanguinis in order to fulfil the requirements of Art 14(1)(b) and section 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule.”

Here, we believe the judge appears to have conflated the application of section 1(a) with that of section 1(e).

The jus sanguinis principle in section 1(a) of Part II requires proof that the applicant has a lineage linking him to Malaysia, that is, one of his parents must be a Malaysian citizen.

In section 1(e), however, the principle is used the other way. It establishes that the applicant does not have parents who are citizens of another country, that is, that he was not born a citizen of another country. It is the same principle of blood lineage, but directed to a different question.

Although the judge himself correctly noted that each of the five paragraphs under section 1 of Part II stands on its own, he applied to our section 1(e) application the requirements of section 1(a).

This led to his conclusion in para 26 of the grounds, where he said: “for the purpose of citizenship under Article 14(1)(b) read with Section 1 (e), the applicant failed to show that his mother is a citizen.”

One then needs to ask: why not apply under section 1(a)? If that were the test, there would be no need for section 1(e) in Part II of the Second Schedule.

In our respectful submission, this is further reason to question the judge’s interpretation. If a judgment renders part of the Federal Constitution redundant, it is fair to ask whether that interpretation is correct.

This is why we took the matter to the Court of Appeal. However, we were again disappointed.

The Court of Appeal panel also did not accept our contention that jus sanguinis should be applied differently under section 1(e) of Part II than under section 1(a).

Under 1(a), the applicant has to show a blood lineage to Malaysian citizenship. His mother would have to be a citizen of Malaysia for him to qualify, given that his parents’ marriage was not registered and section 17 of Part III excudes his father from this consideration.

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Under 1(e), however, the applicant has to prove that he has no blood lineage that grants him citizenship of any other country. In other words, he has to present evidence that his birth mother did not hold citizenship of any country.

To establish this, he provided:

  • A birth certificate stating that his mother, B, was born in Kuala Lumpur in December 1952.
  • Registration Department statements showing that two of his mother’s elder siblings were born in Malaysia. This establishes that his family was in Malaya since at least 1944, the year his second uncle was born.
  • A DNA test showing that Madam P is the elder sister of his mother, B, and that V is the biological son of B.
  • His mother’s birth certificate, which records her citizenship as “belum ditentukan” (undetermined as yet). This indicates that the Registration Department has not established that she is a citizen of any other country.
  • Statutory declarations from his aunt P and the cousin who helped him register his birth in 2011, when V was 24. Both attest to the main facts of his history as recited above.

Given all of this, V has provided evidence that he:

  • was born in Malaysia
  • was born after Malaysia Day
  • does not have a lineage claim to citizenship in any other country, as his mother was not a citizen of any other country at the time of his birth, or afterwards

With respect, the Court of Appeal panel also did not accept our submission that jus sanguinis, as applied under 1(e), should not mirror its application under 1(a).

As explained above, under 1(a) the applicant has to show his mother is a Malaysian citizen.

Under 1(e), in our submission, he has to show that his mother had no claim to citizenship in any other country at the time of his birth. We submit that he has done so quite thoroughly.

At both the High Court and Court of Appeal levels, the judges correctly noted that jus sanguinis has a bearing on the merits of a 1(e) application.

But they did not accept that, under 1(e), this principle involves proving that his mother is not a citizen of any other country.

Instead, the courts asked whether his mother was a Malaysian citizen at the time of V’s birth.

She was not. If she had been, V could have applied under 1(a). Why go through 1(e) at all?

But the courts did not accept that, under 1(e), jus sanguinis does not require the applicant to prove that his mother was a Malaysian citizen at the time of his birth.

Yet that appears to be the reasoning on which V’s application was rejected.

A man in limbo

Sadly, V remains in limbo, struggling to provide for his five children, one of whom has a brain tumour.

At the time of writing, he is in a police cell in Slim River as he was unable to produce an identity card or passport.

Apart from taking the matter to the Federal Court, what would you advise him or us to do?

The views expressed in Aliran's media statements and the NGO statements we have endorsed reflect Aliran's official stand. Views and opinions expressed in other pieces published here do not necessarily reflect Aliran's official position.

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Jeyakumar Devaraj
Dr Jeyakumar Devaraj, a long-time Aliran member and contributor, served as Member of Parliament for Sungai Siput from 2008 to 2018. A respiratory physician who was awarded a gold medal for community service, he is also a secretariat member of the Coalition Against Health Care Privatisation and chairperson of the Socialist Party of Malaysia.
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