The Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, once described war as the 'mere continuation of policy by other means'.

Malaysia is not at war with any other state.

However, in the one and a half years since Anwar Ibrahim's sacking, Dr Mahathir Mohamad and his Barisan Nasional (BN) government have been waging a 'war against Reformasi', while the opposition, finally cooperating as Barisan Alternatif (BA), has countered with a 'war against injustice'.

Nearly six months past the November 1999 general election, one might say that the results of both 'wars' have not been altogether satisfactory for their respective campaigners.

Anwar was successively defeated in the government, UMNO and the court. But in November 1999, the 'Anwar affair' contributed to UMNO's loss of 22 parliamentary seats, 55 state assembly seats, the state government of Trengganu, and about half of all Malay votes.

Subsequently the different arms of Mahathir's government have used other means to pursue their unfulfilled policy of putting an end to Reformasi.

Some of the means used were ludicrous, such as the Melaka government's prohibition of official visits to Kelantan and Trengganu. Others were spiteful, including charging BA leaders with a number of alleged offences, clamping down on alternative media, and blacklisting 'Reformasi doctors, lawyers and contractors'.

Yet others were simply desperate, especially the police strike at the commemoration of the first anniversary of 14 April 1999, on which day Anwar was sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

That a peaceful public commemoration of 'Black April' had to be 'pre-empted' by massive police action gives the lie to Mahathir's claim that the BN's victory in the Sanggang by-election on April Fool's Day has expunged the 'Anwar factor' from Malaysian politics.

Although it was not intended to be such, the police action – before, during and after the commemoration of 'Black April' – is evidence that Reformasi is not dead.

Reformasi is alive, contrary to the dear hopes of its would-be suppressors and the gloomy predictions of its fair-weather friends.

But the results of BA's historic attempt to move from Reformasi to a 'two coalition system' in Malaysian politics have not been reassuring. Despite the exceptionally tense circumstances of September 1998 to November 1999, the BA couldn't deny the BN a two-thirds majority in parliament.

Under present conditions, which are quite different, how does the BA make progress?

Should the BA continue to call for mass demonstrations regardless of its supporters' combat fatigue? Must the BA's leaders persist in courting arrest when the police are only too happy to oblige? By what means can the BA more effectively continue its 'war against injustice'?

I don't pose these questions to belittle the dedication and courage of BA leaders and supporters who defend constitutional rights and civil liberties on behalf of all Malaysians without counting their personal cost.

But these questions, in one way or another, are related to the biggest obstacle to the BA's effort to realize a 'two coalition system' – that is, BA's relative lack of political organization.

Among the BA's partners, only Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) has a strong organization built up over many years. The very new Parti KeADILan Nasional (keADILan) enjoys a big following but lacks an experienced leadership. Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM) has a much respected leadership but a very limited reach to the grassroots. As a 'cadre party', the Democratic Action Party (DAP) has not embarked on developing a mass membership. Practically all the Reformasi-friendly non-governmental organizations have too few troops to offer.

The contrast with the major BN parties is glaring. The United Malays National Organization (UMNO) has over two million members, and links to government and semi-government bodies, chambers of commerce, youth associations, and so on. The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) have consolidated their ties with the Chinese town halls, chambers of commerce, and guilds and associations, even winning over groups once supportive of the DAP.

Never mind how these BN parties attained their organizational strengths. The point is, as the 1999 election showed, there are serious limits to what the noble sentiments and brave support of ordinary citizens can achieve, even under exceptional circumstances.

The BA parties themselves surely realize the extent of the problem of political organization which they face. Already there is talk that PRM and keADILan may seek political synergy by merging into a single party. DAP, too, has lately mobilized its leaders and members to move 'Together Towards Reform'.

Where these efforts will lead to remains to be seen. But they can only have a significant impact if eventually – but not later than the next election! – BA's parties individually and collectively expand their support bases, strengthen their organizations and extend their 'outreach', particularly to the 'unconverted'.

Political organization naturally means more than numbers and bodies. It also means developing a political programme which offers a convincing alternative to what BN provides.

BA's attempt to build a 'rainbow coalition' is still experimental. BA has not yet convinced enough voters that PAS's Islam, DAP's 'Malaysian Malaysia', PRM's 'social democracy' and keADILan's 'national justice' can be blended into an enduring answer to the problems of Malaysian society.

Non-Muslims who are not alarmed by warnings about an 'Islamic state' have nonetheless had to worry about the kharaj tax proposed by PAS right after it took over the government of Trengganu. Women, especially liberal minded Muslim women who lent staunch support to Reformasi, have had to grapple with the implications of the tudung pronouncement PAS made just before the Sanggang by-election.

Moreover, Malaysian society will always have to contend with issues such as protests against the 'non-Malay Astro channels' or the (approved but long-delayed) construction of a Catholic church in Shah Alam.

These issues, and many others real or contrived, are the playthings of those who profit by manipulating sensitive ethnic and religious issues.

Thus far BA's leadership has not mishandled these issues. It has even kept the momentum of 'inter-civilizational dialogues' going. But BA should go beyond 'dialogues among leaders'. Otherwise, BA will only be applying BN's elitist formula of 'behind-closed-doors' horse-trading that leaves ordinary citizens brooding in mutual suspicion.

In this regard, it is necessary to ask: What has BA done with its October 1999 Joint Manifesto?

The original Joint Manifesto was a lengthy, wordy and academic document. It was not easily accessible to many people. Yet this manifesto gave voters their first significant glimpse that PAS, DAP, PRM and keADILan could overcome their differences in ideology and programme.

However, not much has been heard about the Joint Manifesto after the election. BA has not updated, upgraded and popularized the Joint Manifesto to achieve three goals that are critical to BA's cohesion or success.

First, the Joint Manifesto should provide a concise alternative vision of how Malaysian society and politics should be reformed and reorganized.

Second, the Joint Manifesto should be a binding alternative 'social contract' to which BA's collective leadership regularly refers for decision-making, especially when controversial issues arise.

And, third, only a widely accepted Joint Manifesto can supply Malaysian society with the kind of unifying influence that will prevent BA from disappearing into the fissures of our multiethnic and multireligious society.

The results of the past four general elections prove – if proof is still needed – that no single opposition party can successfully challenge the dominance of UMNO, let alone the 14-party BN.

In 1986 when DAP secured 24 parliamentary seats (its highest number ever), PAS won one seat. In 1990, DAP and Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) held their ground, and PAS improved its showing, but Parti Melayu Semangat 46 (S46) couldn't deliver. In 1995, PBS, PAS and S46 all declined somewhat while DAP was thrashed. We know what happened in 1999.

BA must draw the right lessons from this bit of electoral history and communicate them to the populace.

This pattern of uneven performance will haunt the opposition for as long as it is unable to present itself as a cohesive coalition with a credible alternative programme. There's as little use for anyone to be exasperated with the Chinese and Indian pro-BN voters in 1999 as with the pro-UMNO Malay voters in, say, 1986.

DAP should stop mourning its 'catastrophic loss' in 1999: Its real catastrophe, from which it hasn't recovered, occurred in 1995.

PAS's recent defeat in Sanggang should caution PAS against being complacent about its 27 seats and two state governments: It's too early to tell if the 1999 Malay swing away from UMNO is more than a one-off fling with PAS.

Whatever its problems, BA hasn't dissolved after the election. That is an achievement in itself because BA represents the only realistic chance of achieving a 'two-coalition system' that checks the decline of constitutional democracy in this country.

The thrust of BA's post-election programme is encouraging. The formation of its twenty bureaus and increasing cooperation among its parliamentarians speak of a coalition that dares to prepare to be an alternative government. BA's continued willingness to cooperate with non-partisan groups and individuals, and to campaign on gender issues in and out of parliament are signs of a commitment to developing a broad democratic front.

But reforming Malaysian society and politics is a huge task. As a reminder, none of the draconian statutes – Internal Security Act, Official Secrets Act, Sedition Act, University and University Colleges Act and the Printing Presses and Printing Act – which throttle freedom and democracy has been repealed.

BA has a lot of work to do, a lot of ground to cover, and, frankly, not that much time to do either. It operates on a playing field that isn't level, but that is the only field it will have. It operates under harsh conditions which the BN government will not relax.

These are compelling reasons why BA must urgently find new, creative and productive means of continuing its 'war against injustice'. Otherwise Malaysian society won't be able to expunge the blot of Black April from its history.