When The Quitting Gets Tough

Would Ling Liong Sik's resignation really matter?

by Khoo Boo Teik

When he realized last year that Barisan Nasional's political fortune rested heavily on non-Malay (read Chinese) support, Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad favourably compared the Chinese with the Malays. Unlike the Malays, said he, the Chinese were rational and unemotional and knew what was good (BN) and what was bad (opposition) for them.

Arguably BN's retention of a large proportion of Chinese support in the November 1999 general election suggested that there were enough Chinese who were flattered thus by Mahathir. But should anyone be persuaded that the Chinese are more rational and less emotional than 'people of other races'?

Chinese Opera

Watch the 'Chinese reactions' to the little opera the Malaysian Chinese Association has been enacting since 22 May 2000, when MCA president, Dr Ling Liong Sik, announced he would resign as Minister of Transport.

Many in MCA, the Chinese community and the Chinese-language press were 'shocked', 'saddened' or 'stunned'. Others could only speak in such strong terms as 'irreplaceable loss', 'irreparable damage' or 'betrayal of trust'.

This emotional outflow was not matched by rational or persuasive answers to key questions raised by Ling's announcement.

Why, for example, should the MCA president quit his Cabinet post now when his party had just performed very well in two successive general elections, something MCA had not been able to accomplish before November 1999?

If Ling had intended to retire from politics altogether, why would he keep his party post as if to emulate Musa Hitam who resigned as deputy prime minister in 1986 but remained as Deputy President of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO)?

If, however, Ling's aim was to shield MCA against any fallout from a rumoured investigation linking his son, Lim Hee Leong, with the latter's ex-business partner and now fugitive, Soh Chee Wen � an 'evil lie that can only come out of an evil mind', according to Ling � why should the MCA leadership so anxiously reject it?

Divided and Disgruntled

Speculative answers to these questions have not clarified the situation. They have only fueled suspicions that MCA is internally divided and disgruntled at UMNO while Ling's leadership is less than unchallenged.

Things became more muddled when those who might have had a hand in provoking Ling's decision denied having done so.

The prime minister, whose prerogative in firing Cabinet ministers is well established, said he had persuaded Ling to stay but accepted that 'family matters' lay behind Ling's motive to quit. Ling's chief rivals in MCA, who might have rejoiced over his departure took affront at any hint that Ling had 'sacrificed' his Cabinet post to appease them.

Ling himself befuddled matters by taking a two-week vacation to ponder the wisdom of his announcement after having said that his decision was 'final'.

Non-transparent politics

Not for the first time, therefore, non-transparent conduct at high levels in the political system has left the public floundering in uncertainty while the politicians play what they alone regard as deep, deep games.

Malaysians should finish with this kind of shabby treatment. The Chinese community in particular doesn't benefit from uninformed worries that its future is tied to the 'hidden truth' behind some 'irreplaceable' politician's 'to-be-confirmed half-withdrawal'.

A strictly unemotional response to the riddle of Ling's announcement would simply note that the answer will eventually surface � but to no great shakes for anyone other than the individuals involved in MCA's factional fighting.

A considerably more rational approach would seek to understand MCA's present role in Malaysian politics. It is a very limited role as a brief history of MCA will show.

MCA: 1960s and 1970s

MCA's role has been progressively reduced since 1959 when its president, Dr Lim Chong Eu, failed to secure one-third of the Alliance's parliamentary nominations. For his pain, Dr Lim was edged out of power and led his supporters out of MCA. The MCA rump they left behind accommodated itself to a 'less-than-equal' position vis-à-vis UMNO.

Then came the 1969 election. MCA was so badly beaten that some of its leaders wanted to stay out of government to 'teach the Chinese a lesson'. Some UMNO politicians, including the defeated Dr Mahathir, wanted to keep MCA out since it could no longer claim to be 'the party of the Chinese'. In the event, the National Operations Council ruled after 13 May 1969 with token MCA representation. Only when NOC returned power to the Alliance in 1972 did MCA become part of the government again.

When the Alliance was replaced with BN in 1974, MCA withdrew from the government to ponder its future. With Lee San Choon succeeding Tan Siew Sin as party president, however, MCA joined the enlarged coalition, no doubt aware that the party's influence vis-à-vis UMNO had been further diminished.

MCA: 1980s

From mid- to late 1980s, when the bitter inter-ethnic politics of the New Economic Policy reached its height, MCA led a pitiable existence. It was half ignored by UMNO, more than half rejected by Chinese voters, taunted by Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) and perennially challenged by the Democratic Action Party (DAP).

Three crises in 1985-87 brought MCA's position to a new low. BN threatened to expel MCA because the latter could not resolve the all-out battle between the Neo Yee Pan and Tan Koon Swan factions. But no sooner had Tan Koon Swan won the MCA presidency than he had to go to jail in Singapore for criminal breach of trust. At the August 1986 general election, MCA was thrashed by DAP.

In response, some MCA leaders superficially united with DAP to oppose certain government policies. This move coincided with UMNO's own Team A-Team B split to produce a level of interethnic tension not seen since 1969. It in no small way contributed to Operasi Lalang, the mass arrests of 27 October 1987.

Recovering and Riding High?

The 1990 election once again saw MCA badly bruised, even completely defeated in Penang.

Only in 1995 did MCA recover from its electoral reverses. But there is more than a small truth in Muhammad Muhammad Taib's recent curt reminder that MCA's recovery perhaps owed more to an unprecedented Chinese adulation of Mahathir than to the party's reinvigoration.

Of course, MCA is riding high today � especially given UMNO's 1999 electoral setback � but in truth that's only possible because its aspiration as a party has sunk quite low.

At its height, MCA was part of the Alliance which negotiated the terms for Merdeka. In the early years of Alliance rule, MCA had strong influence over financial and economic policies, and contributed to the determination of politically sensitive policies on education, language and culture.

Presently MCA has lost practically all that influence. MCA may still have more Cabinet and government posts than all other BN component parties, except UMNO. However, UMNO holds all the senior ministries of finance, home affairs, education, international trade and defence, not to mention the posts of prime minister and deputy prime minister.

Someone who wants to mount a spirited (shall we say, emotional) defence of MCA will criticize me for overstating the party's decline. Yet, forty-three years after Merdeka, can anyone deny that MCA scarcely penetrates the inner policy-making loop of the UMNO-dominated government?

Isn't it revealing, too, that when Mahathir praised Ling in the present context Mahathir paid no higher compliment than that the Minister of Transport did a good job marketing the country's ports?

UMNO's dominance

Time and time again UMNO leaders have insisted that the reality of BN politics is UMNO's dominance. It is a basic plank of Mahathir's political thinking and practice that UMNO alone can rule the country but coalition allows a modicum of 'power sharing' with other, obviously junior, parties.

Parties which couldn't accept UMNO's dominance � such as Parti Islam Se-Malaysia in the 1970s, or Parti Bersatu Sabah in 1990 � couldn't expect to stay long in BN.

After November 1999, for the first time ever, UMNO has less than half of BN's seats in parliament. UMNO holds 48.6 per cent of BN's seats. Unless something drastic happens to UMNO, or the entire basis of BN politics is changed, this is a minor setback that doesn't permit MCA or any other BN party to question UMNO's dominance.

New Kapitan China

In short, MCA today virtually serves as UMNO's 'Chinese adjunct'. With limited authority, MCA watches over 'Chinese welfare', makes small redresses of 'Chinese grievances' and reminds 'Chinese voters' of what's good and bad for them. In the process, MCA has become quite effective as the promoter of selected social, educational and cultural projects.

Ironically MCA has done best when it has done least. Would it be far-fetched then to compare MCA's present role to that of the colonial Kapitan China, Protector of the Chinese, or Secretary of Chinese Affairs?

Those who think that Ling's announcement arose from MCA's unhappiness at not receiving more Cabinet and government posts surely underestimate the realism of many MCA leaders who were dependent on UMNO-backed 'safe seats' until recently.

MCA leaders know that Mahathir was being frank in saying MCA has been given its quota of Cabinet and government posts. The quota was not reduced when MCA was down and out, but won't be increased when MCA does much better, at any rate not at UMNO's expense.

That helps to explain why, after the 1999 election, MCA tried hard to wrest the Penang chief minister's post from Gerakan (particularly after two Gerakan state assemblymen defected to MCA). It also explains why certain MCA factions consider that Ling had breached a 'gentleman's agreement' by not appointing their leaders to Cabinet positions.

One can be sure that 'Part II' of MCA's impasse will be played out now that Ling has returned from leave. No matter who comes and who goes, however, the Chinese community shouldn't expect far-reaching changes in MCA's character or policy or vision or influence. At stake in the current impasse is nothing greater than personal-factional interests of one kind or another.

For myself, I like one observer's depiction of this episode as a ribut di bawah tempurung (a storm under a coconut shell). Now that could only have come from an admirably rational and unemotional bloke.