On 22 June, a parliamentary special select committee report was released detailing proposed amendments to the bill to separate the offices of the attorney general and the public prosecutor.
This followed a review of the Constitution (Amendment) (No 2) Bill 2026 tabled in the first parliamentary sitting of 2026. The bill is due for its second reading in the House of Representatives.
While the proposed amendments aim to address long-standing issues regarding the weaknesses of a fused attorney general-public prosecutor, they remain insufficient in ensuring that the appointment and office of the public prosecutor is functionally independent from any form of executive interference.
The Center to Combat Corruption and Cronyism (C4 Center) is in full support of the separation of the attorney general and public prosecutor offices.
However, this reform must aim for the highest possible standard to ensure that it serves as a step forward for the country, and not a step back.
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C4 Center highlights serious issues with the planned amendments below and urges the government to meaningfully involve Parliament in the appointment of the public prosecutor.
Address long-standing issues
The public prosecutor’s primary role is to direct prosecutions against any individual alleged to have committed a crime. To ensure justice and impartiality, the public prosecutor’s office must be as independent from external influence or interests as possible.
On the other hand, the attorney general’s primary function is to act as legal counsel and provide advice to the government of the day, ie the executive.
Presently, with both the attorney general and public prosecutor being the same individual, there is a vulnerability to conflicts of interest. These roles may conflict when members of the executive are charged with crimes, meaning that the attorney general-public prosecutor cannot reasonably act to provide meaningful checks and balances on the executive.
Therefore, solving these issues would require that the offices of the attorney general and public prosecutor be separate and occupied by two different individuals.
Moreover, due to the public prosecutor serving a crucial public function of ensuring accountability and justice, his or her appointment must be subject to meaningful parliamentary involvement as elected representatives of the public.
Parliamentary oversight over the public prosecutor must also extend to removal from the role, disciplinary proceedings and mandatory reporting of relevant information.
Proposed appointment process
Instead of a prime ministerial appointment, the amendments propose that the Judicial and Legal Service Commission will advise the Agong on the appointment of the public prosecutor.
Under the current proposal, the commission may provide several candidates for the Agong to choose from.
However, this process would undermine Parliament’s ability to make a clear and final decision of a candidate for public prosecutor.
For further context, the proposed amendments establish a Judicial and Legal Service Commission that comprises:
- The chairperson of the Public Service Commission;
- The Chief Judge of the High Court in Malaya (addition from bill)
- The Chief Judge of the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak (addition from bill)
- The attorney general, provided that he or she is not an MP (addition from bill)
- The public prosecutor (addition from bill)
- The solicitor general
- a member who shall be appointed by the Agong at his discretion, after consultation with the chief justice of the Federal Court, from among people who are or have been or are qualified to be a judge of the Federal Court, Court of Appeal or a High Court (addition from bill)
Despite the appointment no longer being at the discretion of the prime minister, the proposed amendment still grants a disproportionate amount of decision-making power to the executive – especially as the majority of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission would also be appointed by the executive.
Parliament’s insignificant role
While the government has touted the role of Parliament in providing checks and balances on this appointment process, deeper scrutiny reveals that the proposed amendments fail to give the legislature any meaningful role for accountability.
According to Clause 145A(18), the Judicial and Legal Service Commission is merely required to inform Parliament about the recommendations.
Additionally, Parliament may only “give comments” on the list of candidates identified by the commission.
To reiterate Parliament’s role in this reform, it must be afforded powers of oversight that are meaningful and not merely cosmetic.
This entails substantive input into the decision-making process of the appointments process of the public prosecutor, including the vetting and deliberation of potential candidates to the role, the power to remove public prosecutors, and the power to impose mandatory reporting duties on the public prosecutor to Parliament for the purposes of questioning and clarification.
Under this proposal, while there is a duty placed on the Judicial and Legal Service Commission to present the names to Parliament, there is no duty placed on any party to take into account comments and objections made by those MPs.
The involvement of Parliament is surface-level as they would only provide comments that may not affect the final outcome with regard to the selection of the public prosecutor.
Further still, the use of the word “may” implies that Parliament’s input into the matter is optional, and that the commission is able to proceed without such input.
Under these provisions, Parliament would be relegated to a mere observer of the process, rather than having any functional input on the appointment of the public prosecutor.
Conclusion
The bill, even after revision by the select committee fails to adequately address major concerns regarding the independence of the public prosecutor.
While Parliament is provided an avenue to ‘comment’ on potential candidates, the legislature lacks any substantive input or accountability over the appointment of the public prosecutor.
With the bill scheduled to be tabled soon, C4 Center urgently demands that it not be passed unless serious revisions are included to mandate meaningful parliamentary oversight over the appointment process.
While C4 Center is fully behind the intention to separate the attorney general and public prosecutor offices, Malaysia cannot risk adopting a flawed constitutional amendment that would surely be a step back for good governance, and one that would require immense time and political will to reverse.
C4 Center strongly recommends that the appointment of the public prosecutor is undertaken as follows:
- Before the Agong is advised on the appointment of the public prosecutor, a list of candidates must be brought before Parliament for scrutiny.
- Parliament, through a special select committee, must vet each candidate, conducting due diligence, background checks and interviews if necessary.
- The findings and recommendation of the select committee must be tabled before the House of Representatives for further debate and transparency.
- The relevant party shall advise the Agong on the appointment of the public prosecutor with only a single nominee from the pool of candidates recommended by Parliament.
– C4 Center
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