Why Asia should shut down US military bases

Kua Kia Soong

The lesson unfolding in the Gulf today is not new – it is simply being replayed with harsher clarity.

States that host foreign military bases often imagine themselves as beneficiaries of security guarantees. In reality, they risk becoming forward operating platforms in conflicts not of their choosing.

When war comes, it does not distinguish between the sovereign decision-maker and the territory that hosts the machinery of war. It strikes where the infrastructure lies.

For Asian countries, this should prompt a long-overdue reassessment. The Iran war has finally demonstrated this truth for Asia.

The strategic trap

From Qatar to Bahrain, Gulf states have spent decades positioning themselves as indispensable security partners of the United States.

In exchange, they gained military protection – but also exposure. Once conflict with Iran escalated, these bases became immediate strategic targets. Sovereignty became conditional; neutrality became impossible.

This is the fundamental trade-off: hosting a foreign military presence does not insulate a country from war – it embeds it within the war architecture.

Asia should take note. Countries such as Japan, South Korea and the Philippines host significant US military facilities. Others allow their ports to be used as service centres for the US Navy. These arrangements are often justified under the language of deterrence.

But deterrence for whom – and at what cost? When tensions rise between the US and China or between the US and North Korea, it is not Washington that will be geographically exposed. It is Okinawa, it is Busan, it is Luzon. Even Malaysia and Singapore will not be spared if at all they host US warships.

The illusion of borrowed security

The dominant argument in favour of US bases is straightforward: without them, Asian countries would be vulnerable to Chinese military pressure. But this claim deserves scrutiny.

For decades, China has risen economically and militarily. Yet outside of specific contested zones such as the South China Sea and issues tied to Taiwan, there is little evidence of China attempting to impose military domination over sovereign Asian states in the way that colonial or Cold War powers once did. It has not invaded Japan. It has not coerced South Korea into submission. It has not even occupied its own province of Taiwan.

It has not established overseas military bases across Asia comparable to the global footprint of the United States.

This does not mean China is benign or that its actions are beyond criticism. Its assertiveness in maritime disputes is real. But there is a difference between regional disputes – however serious – and a systematic pattern of military occupation or regime coercion across Asia.

The fear of hypothetical domination should not be used to justify permanent entanglement in another power’s military strategy.

Reclaiming strategic autonomy

Allowing foreign bases is, at its core, a partial surrender of sovereign control. Decisions about war and peace become entangled with the strategic calculations of an external power. An independent foreign policy becomes harder to sustain. In times of crisis, neutrality is no longer credible.

This is why New Zealand’s example is instructive. Its long-standing anti-nuclear and independent defence posture – formalised through the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987 – demonstrates that a country can maintain security without hosting foreign military bases. It has not led to invasion, nor has it rendered the country strategically irrelevant. Instead, it has reinforced its credibility as an independent actor.

Australia, by contrast, chose to join Aukus [a trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK and the US] and host US assets. In doing so, it has arguably made itself vulnerable if a conflict breaks out between the US and China – when no such threat existed before.

Asian security need not be organised around great-power rivalry. There are alternatives:

• Regional multilateralism through institutions like Asean, which emphasises dialogue over alignment and could help curb the senseless arms race among member states
• Non-alignment or strategic neutrality, allowing countries to engage economically with all major powers while avoiding military entanglement
• Defensive self-reliance, focusing on territorial defence rather than power projection – an approach grounded, ultimately, in sovereign dignity.

These approaches do not eliminate risk, but they avoid importing external conflicts wholesale.

History shows that military bases attract conflict. They are not passive installations but active nodes in a global network of force projection.

If confrontation between the US and China escalates, bases in Asia will not be symbolic – they will be operational targets. The countries that host them will bear the immediate consequences.

The Gulf states are learning this the hard way: proximity to power invites proximity to danger.

Asian countries face a choice. They can continue down a path of security dependency, embedding themselves deeper into the military architecture of a distant power. Or they can begin the difficult process of reclaiming strategic autonomy.

Removing foreign bases is not about choosing China over the US. It is about choosing oneself.

The question is not whether China might exert pressure in the future. Rather, it is whether Asian nations should pre-emptively surrender their autonomy out of fear of a threat that remains largely hypothetical – while exposing themselves to very real and immediate risks.

True security does not come from hosting another power’s weapons. Instead, it comes from maintaining the freedom to decide when – and whether – to be drawn into war.

Dr Kua Kia Soong, a former MP, is the director of human rights group Suaram.

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