Khatami's re-election in 2001 showed that Iranians fully supported the reform agenda

The controversial death edict against Hashem Aghajari, late last year, highlights the intense political struggle between reformists and conservatives taking place in Iran today. At the heart of this struggle is the dispute over what the Islamic state should look like, the role of the clergy and whether or not such a state can be democratic.

Hashem Aghajari, a close ally of reformist President Khatami, was sentenced to death for blasphemy on account of his call for a �religious renewal� of Shi�a Islam(1)�. In a speech commemorating the 25th anniversary of the death of Ali Shariati(2)�, the disabled Iran-Iraq war veteran said that the clerics were not divine and that Muslims were not �monkeys� to blindly follow the teachings of senior clerics.

In February 2003, Iran�s Supreme Court revoked the death sentence and referred the case to an appeals court for it to review the remainder of the sentence. Hashem Aghajari�s fate remains uncertain � in addition to being sentenced to death he had also been sentenced to 74 lashes, banned from teaching for 10 years and banished to three remote cities for eight years.

The Iranian Clergy

The Shi�a clergy has always played an important role in Iranian politics. Their recent ascent to the pinnacle of power however is a consequence of the Iranian Revolution.

Muhammad Reza Shah, the last Shah, was both brutal and corrupt. His rapid modernization program, devoid of any significant political reform, threatened Iranian identity and culture. A broad spectrum of Iranians opposed his autocratic rule. A series of massive demonstrations and a wave of strikes, which paralyzed industry and brought the oil fields to a standstill made it impossible for him to remain in power. He left Iran in January 1979.

Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile in triumph. Millions thronged the streets to welcome him. Khomeini�s radiobroadcasts while in exile and taped speeches, which were played in mosques throughout Iran, had played an important role in de-legitimizing the rule of the Shah.

The movement to overthrow the Shah was made up of diverse political and ideological groupings � from clerics and Islamic activists to liberal democrats and Marxists. In the aftermath of the Revolution, deep ideological differences surfaced as to what the new political and social order should look like. In particular, there were serious disagreements over the role of the clergy and the implementation of Islamic law.

The group around Khomeini, which advocated direct rule by the clergy, emerged victorious. Their active role in the mass movement and the skillful way in which they were able to form temporary alliances, which they used to their benefit, helped them outmaneuver their opponents. Their radical anti-imperialist posturing (especially after the take over of the US Embassy) and the war of aggression by Iraq helped them expand their base and establish near total power for themselves.

They came to dominate the Revolutionary Guard, the military, the media, the judiciary and parliament. In the name of Islam there was censorship of news and publications and ideological control of university curriculum. Islamic law was implemented.

Miscalculation In the post-revolutionary period, the left commanded some measure of support. Unfortunately some of the major left organisations were not prepared to criticise or critically challenge the new regime. They believed that it was important to remain united behind Khomeini to prevent the regime from becoming the victim of an imperialist coup - a fate that had befallen the Mossadegh government in 1953. In March 1979, when Khomeini issued an edict demanding that women wear the veil and 20,000 women took to the streets in protest, the communist Tudeh Party denounced the "bourgeoisie women" for marching against Khomeini. The Tudeh Party and the Marxist Fedayeen backed Khomeini's line that the unrest in the factorires , the discontent among the segment of Iranian women and the separatist struggle in Kurdistan and elsewhere were all the result of US Imperialism. They made the mistake of abandoning the militant workers, the women and the national minorities. For them what was important was the creation of a popular front. They failed. When Khomeini had fully consolidated his power in 1982, he tuned on them. By 1983, the Tudeh Party and all other left organisations had been completely crushed.

Many groups and individuals who had played a significant role in the revolution fell by the wayside (see Box). Amongst them were Islamic modernists like Mehdi Bazargan and clerics like Ayatollah Shariatmadari who believed that the clergy should only have an indirect role in government.

Dissent both Islamic and secular was crushed. Some were driven out of office while others were driven into exile. Many were imprisoned. It is estimated that some 20,000 opponents of the regime were executed.

A Complex System

The political system that emerged, Iran�s velayat-i-faqih (Government by the Jurist) is an innovative attempt to combine an Islamic theocracy with democracy. It is a complex political system that is like no other.

In this system all Iranians aged 16 and above are entitled to vote. There are direct elections for the Presidency, the Majlis (Parliament) and the Assembly of Experts. However the most powerful center of power in the Iranian system is the Supreme Leader, presently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (3).

The Supreme Leader is at the top of the political pyramid. He appoints the head of the judiciary who in turn appoints the head of the Supreme Court and the chief public prosecutor. He also appoints 6 out of 12 members of the powerful Council of Guardians and the head of radio and TV. He is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

He is chosen from within the ranks of 86 �virtuous and learned� clerics who make up the Assembly of Experts. Clerics in the Assembly of Experts are elected directly by the electorate once every 8 years. The last election took place in 1998. The Assembly has the power to appoint, oversee and if necessary dismiss the Supreme Leader. The current Assembly is dominated by conservatives. It has been criticized for being subservient to the Supreme Leader and for failing to fulfill its supervisory function.

The Council of Guardians, a conservative bastion of power, is made up of 12 persons � 6 clerics and 6 jurists. The Supreme Leader appoints the clerics while the jurists are nominated by the Judiciary and officially appointed by the Majlis. The Council of Guardians has the authority to decide who is eligible to contest elections. The Council can veto unsuitable candidates to the Majlis, the Presidency or the Assembly of Experts. The Council of Guardians also has the authority to determine whether laws passed by the Majlis conform to the Constitution and Islamic Law.

President Khatami is the head of the executive branch. The President is elected by the popular vote and can serve a maximum of two five-year terms. While President Khatami is responsible for the day-to-day running of the country, his powers are limited. There are important portions of the Iranian power structure over which he had absolutely no control. Under the Iranian Constitution the entire executive branch appears to be subordinate to the Supreme Leader.

The Majlis (4), or Parliament, whose members are elected by popular vote every four years, is responsible for drafting legislation. All legislation passed by Parliament must however first pass the scrutiny of the Council of Guardians before becoming law. The Council of Guardians thus has effective veto power over the Majlis. If the Council is unhappy with a particular Bill, the Council can send it back to the Majlis for revision. Over the past 3 years much of the legislation sponsored by the reformist Majlis has been blocked (5).

Disputes over legislation between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians are sometimes referred to the Expediency Council. The Expediency Council, which was formed to arbitrate between the two, is headed by former President Rafsanjani and has for the most part sided with the Council of Guardians in its dispute with the Majlis.

In a nutshell, the reformists control the Presidency and the Majlis while the conservatives control the office of the Supreme Leader, the Council of Guardians, the Judiciary and the Assembly of Experts.

Successes and Failures

24 years after the revolution, there have been some successes. Education is free, and more than 2 million students � many of them women � are in higher education. Well-run literacy campaigns have led to a high literacy rate (84% among men and 70% among women). Iranians have also had the chance to participate in a series of elections - the recent presidential and parliamentary polls were models of transparency. Women vote and there are today 11 female legislators in the Majlis.

The Islamic Republic however faces challenges on many fronts. The economy is ailing � there is widespread corruption, 15% of Iranians lives below the poverty line and there is the serious problem of unemployment - 800,000 young people come into the job market each year in an economy only capable of creating half this number of jobs.

The youth are restless. They resent the strict dress code and other social restrictions like the prohibition against the mingling of the sexes. Two-thirds of Iranians are too young to remember the revolution and for them what is important is that the regime stays out of their personal lives.

On the political front, difficult questions are being asked about the nature of the system. Iranians are asking why non-elected religious leaders should have more power than the democratically elected President. Interestingly, even some senior clerics are questioning the wisdom of the clergy being so entwined in the power structure. They worry that Islam might suffer from the regime�s unpopularity and might even be held responsible for its failures.

Ayatollah Seyed Hossein Mousavi-Tabrizi, the former chief prosecutor of the Revolutionary Court, believes that the ruling regime has strayed: �In more than a hundred references, the Qur�an states that the will of the people must be fulfilled. The idea that only a select number of clerics have the right to make decisions for the masses is un-Islamic and illegal. God hasn�t given anyone an exclusive right to rule. If religion interferes in every detail of government, it will fail.�

The first significant crack in the clergy�s stranglehold of power was Khatami�s victory in the 1997 Presidential elections. He quickly relaxed censorship and licensed numerous new publications. The increased flow of information as a result of this liberalization created a healthy intellectual climate that further accentuated the desire for reform. Some of the publications also managed to expose embarrassing domestic scandals like the murder of several intellectuals in 1998, apparently linked to elements within Iran�s Intelligence Ministry.

Iran�s ruling conservatives do not like being challenged. The judiciary responded to this �liberal� climate by jailing journalists and intellectuals and closing down more than 80 reformist newspapers. Often the rational used was that the reformist elements disparaged Islam and the religious elements of the Iranian revolution.

The 5th Majlis (1996 � 2000) was controlled by conservatives. President Khatami thus spend much of his first term having to contend with a Majlis which was hostile to him and which held up legislation whenever possible. The victory of reformists in the 2000 Parliamentary elections was a major breakthrough. It meant that for the first time since the Revolution, both the executive and the legislature � 2 out of 3 branches of government � were in the hands of the reformists.

Those seeking reform have no desire to return to the past. Rather they are concerned that the revolution has been hijacked by the Shiite clergy that has run out of ideas and is incapable of moving the country forward. What they are demanding is a greater respect for human rights, greater democracy and political participation, freedom for intellectuals and artists to express criticism, a loosening of social restrictions and increasing access for women into positions of responsibility.

The election of President Mohammad Khatami in 1997, the overwhelming victory of reformist in the 2000 Majlis election and Khatami�s reelection in 2001 are a clear sign that this agenda has the full support of the Iranian people.

Confrontation?

Two Bills presently before the Majlis are a modest attempt by reformist to make a dent in the clergy�s tight grip on power.

The first Bill seeks to curb the power of the Council of Guardians by taking away from it the right to veto election candidates. The veto power has been used by conservatives to keep many of their opponents out of power. The stringent ideological screening of candidates(6)� by the Council denies the electorate the choice to a broad spectrum of candidates - undermining the democratic process. Reformists want to put an end to this before Parliamentary elections in 2004 and Presidential elections in 2005.

This Bill was approved by the Majlis in March but rejected shortly after by the Council of Guardians. The Council has returned the Bill to the Majlis alleging that the Bill contained 39 items that contravened the Iranian Constitution and 7 items that conflicted with Islam.

The second Bill gives President Khatami the power to sanction judges and suspend court rulings that are unconstitutional. It is hoped that this Bill will put an end to the use of the courts to muzzle the press and jail journalists and intellectuals.

The fate of these Bills, which President Khatami believes, are crucial to moving the reformist agenda along, is uncertain. The first Bill has already been rejected and returned to the Majlis and it is quite likely that the second Bill will also suffer the same fate.

How the reformist camp will chose to respond is the big question. Some argue that the reformist legislators in the Majlis should resign en-block in protest � a move that would precipitate a full-blown political crisis. Others believe that the Majlis should confront the hardliners by pushing for a national referendum on the issue.

In any case, confronting the institutional hegemony of the conservatives will require a big show of force. Many political analysts doubt whether Iranians, are at this moment willing to take to the streets in large numbers. Thus, while many Iranians may sympathize with the reformist, it is quite possible that the conservatives will survive this round with all their powers intact. They are just too entrenched.

No one however should underestimate the powerful reformist current sweeping through Iran. It is not something that is going to go away! If the Islamic Republic is to survive, then it has no choice but to yield to the reformist mood by opening up and becoming more democratic.

Conclusion

Iran�s velayat-i-faqih is a bold and radical attempt to forge a new political model, incorporating both Islam and democracy. As Iranians grapple with the intricate question of the compatibility of Islam and democracy, of how involved clerics should be in the political process, of reforms and alternatives, they offer to the world, a plethora of ideas and lessons to be learnt.

Iran with its rich history and vibrant intellectual tradition provide advocates and opponents of an Islamic state much needed food for thought. Those who seek to transform the present order would do well to take note of the successes and failures of the Iranian model. What has happened in Iran challenges the simplistic notion that the establishment of an Islamic State will resolve all ills and illustrates the complexity of issues that need to be addressed in a just and rational manner.