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| A question of trust
Are religious institutions trusted more in an Islamic state?
by Riaz Hassan
Notwithstanding several examples of state control of religion in Western societies, these differences are commonly used in scholarly and popular discourses on Islam to account for the different developmental trajectories of Western and Islamic societies. In such analyses Western societies, with their separation of church and state, of civil and religious law, are said to have promoted an autonomous domain for secular culture and civil society, which together form the bases of modernity. In Islamic societies, the lack of differentiation between the secular and the sacred has inhibited such development The historical evidence concerning the separation of state and religion in Islamic history reveals two main institutional configurations. The undifferentiated state-religious configuration characterised a small number of Middle Eastern societies. This configuration was characteristic of lineage or tribal societies. The historic norm for agro-urban Islamic societies was an institutional configuration that recognised the division between state and religious spheres. Despite the common statement that the institutions of state and religion are unified, and that Islam is a total way of life that defines political as well as social and family matters, most Muslim societies did not conform to this ideal, but were built around separate institutions of state and religion. Revival Movements In short the historical scholarship indicates that the institutional configurations of Islamic societies can be classified into two types: a) differentiated social formations (i.e., societies in which religion and state occupy different space) and, b) undifferentiated social formations (i.e., societies in which religion and state are integrated). While a majority of Islamic societies have been and are �differentiated social formations�, a small but significant number have been and are societies that can be classified as �undifferentiated social formations�. A label commonly used in contemporary discourse for undifferentiated Muslim social formations is �Islamic State.� Irrespective of the historical evidence, relations between the state and religion are an important issue in contemporary Muslim countries. Many Muslim countries are a product of the process of decolonisation in this century, where nationalist movements were spearheaded by relatively secular leaders. These new states have defined their identities in nationalist terms and in many cases have preserved the secular legal, educational and political institutions inherited from the colonial era. Islamic revival movements have emerged in many Muslim countries, however, and in general they denounce the trend toward secularisation, calling for the return to a state that represents and embodies Islam and enforces an Islamic way of life.
Public Trust While the relations between the state and religious institutions are a significant concern of the Islamic world, there is no empirical study of the attitudes of Muslims toward different institutional configurations. The issue here is whether religious institutions enjoy more or less trust in the public mind in differentiated Muslim social formations, in which religion and the state are separate, than in undifferentiated Muslim social formations, in which religion and the state are closely integrated. Public trust in institutions of the state and civil society is an important symbol of political legitimacy of the state and its agencies. Drawing from empirical evidence gathered as part of an international study of Muslim religiosity we are now in a position to examine this issue by comparing data about the level of trust in the state and civil society in institutions in different Muslim countries and also compare the level of trust in undifferentiated and differentiated Muslim social formations The data for the study were gathered through an international study of Muslim religiosity. This study was carried out in seven countries, namely Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Iran and Malaysia. ( The details of this study and how it was carried out are reported in my book Faithlines: Muslim Conceptions of Islam and Society, Oxford University Press 2003). The respondents in all seven countries were asked how much trust they had in key institutions of the state and civil society namely: Ulema, Parliament, Press, Universities, Imam Masjid, Courts, Television, Pirs/Kiyai/Ustaz, Civil Service, Major Companies and Intellectuals. Findings: The empirical findings show that there are wide variations as well as similarities among respondents in the seven countries in terms of their trust in core institutions of religion and the state.
Striking Differences The most striking differences between the countries relate to trust in the Islamic institutions. In Malaysia, Indonesia and Egypt, the Ulema and the Imam Masjid are the most trusted institutions of civil society. The institution of Pirs/Kiyai/ Ustaz is very highly trusted in Malaysia and Indonesia, and moderately in Egypt. In Pakistan and Iran, the two countries that can be described as undifferentiated states i.e. Islamic States, trust in the religious institutions was relatively low. The key institutions of the state namely, Parliament, Civil Service and the Courts were trusted by a significantly smaller proportions of respondents in the study except in Malaysia where the level of trust was comparatively higher. In Malaysia there is also a greater level of trust in the media. These findings are interesting because this is the first time such an empirical study has been carried out in major Muslim communities in different regions of the world, and with different institutional configurations. Intuitively, one would expect that since Iran and Pakistan are the only Islamic states (Undifferentiated states) among the seven countries the level of trust in the religious institutions should be relatively high. The results are the exact opposite. In relative terms, even the trust shown in religious institutions in Kazakhstan as compared with state institutions was surprising, although one must treat Kazakhstan as a special case, given its recent history. In view of this evidence we can say that the faithlines in contemporary Malaysian, Indonesian and Egyptian societies are very clearly delineated. The state institutions are held in low to moderately high esteem (especially in Malaysia), and the religious institutions are held in the highest esteem. In Iran and Pakistan, both state and religious institutions are held in low esteem, and a similar pattern prevails in Kazakhstan. Low Levels Of Trust In Religious Institutions In Islamic States: an explanation What could be a possible explanation of these findings and what are their sociological implications? An explanatory hypothesis can be constructed in the following way. Given that in all of the societies under study except Malaysia there is a relatively low level of trust in key state institutions, we can hypothesise that a dialectical process is created by the social and political conditions within which key state institutions enjoy only low levels of esteem, and consequently political legitimacy, among their citizens. The main business of the state is to govern and manage the affairs of society in a fair and unbiased manner. When the state or its key institutions lack social/political legitimacy in the public mind, the state must use varying degrees of coercion to ensure compliance. This the citizens inevitably resist, which in turn produces a more authoritarian state response. This generates further resistance, and so a cycle of authoritarian response and resistance develops. The state ultimately comes to be seen as authoritarian, oppressive and unfair and this leads to political mobilisation against the state. The institutions of civil society that act as the mobilisers of this resistance gain in public trust and consequently come to enjoy high levels of esteem and legitimacy among the public. In differentiated Muslim social formations, the religious institutions play a vital public role in the mobilisation of resistance to the state, thereby increasing their esteem in the public mind. Universities and Public Intellectuals are also held in high esteem for the same reason. In Pakistan and Iran, however, the situation is different. Pakistan and Iran are undifferentiated social formations in which religious institutions are integrated in the state structures. The erosion of trust in state institutions, therefore, also corrodes trust in the religious institutions that are perceived as part of the state. The Intellectuals and Universities are probably trusted because of their role as mobilisers of resistance against a state perceived as weak, ineffectual and authoritarian. The low level of trust in religious institutions in Pakistan and Iran further reduces the trust in the state institutions. In the case of Kazakhstan, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union has resulted in unparalleled political, social and economic insecurity, and the low level of trust in all institutions is probably indicative of that insecurity. The case of Turkey offers an interesting example. In Turkey the level of trust in all key institutions except Universities and intellectuals is relatively low. But even in this staunchly secular Muslim country the religious institutions appear to be gaining in public acceptance and trust. This is clearly indicated in the results of recent Turkish elections in which the Islamically affiliated Justice and Development Party won strong public support to become the dominant single political party in the Turkish Parliament and is now the governing political party in Turkey. Public Trust Or Political Power? Viewed from this perspective, the findings may have important implications for the institutional configuration of the state in Muslim countries. An Islamic state that lacks trust, and consequently political legitimacy, in the public mind, may in fact cause an erosion of trust in Islamic institutions, thereby further weakening the fabric of civil society. For the religious elite in Muslim countries, the message of these findings is that an Islamic State may not always be in the best interest of Islamic institutions and religious elite. They can have public trust or political power but not both. To promote a constructive socio-cultural, moral and religious role for religious institutions within a Muslim society, it may be prudent to keep faithlines separate from the state, and thereby prevent them from becoming the faultlines of the political terrain. The findings should be of special interest to the Malaysian Islamic political activists seeking to establish an Islamic state in the country. If they succeed in these efforts it may have an adverse impact on the level of public trust they appear to enjoy now among the Malays overtime. These findings also have implications for the ruling elite, particularly in differentiated Muslim societies. The findings also show a �feedback� effect. The level of trust in religious institutions is directly related to the level of trust in the institutions of the state. This means that attempts to disestablish Islam may have adverse consequences for the level of trust in and legitimacy of the state itself. The implication for the international community is that if an Islamic state were to come into existence through democratic and constitutional means, support for such a state could in the long run pave the way for the development of a kind of differentiated Muslim social formation. Separation Allows Constructive Role In summary, integration of religion and the state in Muslim countries may not always be in the best interests of Islamic institutions and the religious elite, because when a state carries a deficit of trust in the public mind, public trust in religious institutions is also eroded. This could have serious social, cultural, political and religious implications. For example, if the public lacks trust in the institutions of the Ulema and Imam Masjid, this could significantly undermine the fabric of civil society. Such a situation may also not be conducive to the profession and promotion of the universality of Islamic values. This would also suggest that religious institutions within a Muslim society continue to play a constructive social, cultural and religious role when religion is kept separate from the state and when these institutions enjoy an appropriate place in the institutional configurations of the society. It may be prudent, therefore, to keep faith separate from the state. There is, of course, the logical possibility of a Muslim society that is characterised by high levels of trust in and esteem for the state, and in which there is also a high level of trust in religious institutions. However, as far as we know, there are no contemporary examples of such a situation that can be readily identified. This raises the interesting question of why this is so? Does it mean that such a situation is not possible, or could such a situation possibly come about under circumstances in which different political arrangements prevail between Islam and the state? It is hope that this question as well as the findings reported here will stimulate further debate and discussion on the relationship between the state and religious institutions in Muslim countries.
Now e-mail us and tell us what you think. Your comments might be published in the Letters section of our print magazine, Aliran Monthly.
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...integration of religion and the state in Muslim countries may not always be in the best interests of Islamic institutions and the religious elite, because when a state carries a deficit of trust in the public mind, public trust in religious institutions is also eroded.
